Abstract. This paper defines a generalization of Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions. We prove that our logic is stuttering-invariant and give an axiomatization of its propositional fragment. We also show that standard TLA is as expressive as our extension once quantification over flexible propositions is added.
Background
Temporal logics are routinely used for the specification and analysis of reactive systems. However, Lamport [10] has identified a shortcoming of standard linear-time temporal logic (LTL): because it is based on a global notion of "next state", it does not allow to relate specifications written at different levels of abstraction. He has therefore maintained that specifications should be invariant under "stuttering", that is, finite repetitions of identical states, and has proposed the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [12, 13, 6] . Characteristically, TLA formulas contain the "next-time" operator only in a restricted form and can therefore not distinguish between stuttering-equivalent behaviors. Several case studies have established TLA as a useful formalism for describing systems; on the theoretical side, researchers have studied questions such as the description of real-time and hybrid systems [3, 11] , the representation of assumption-commitment reasoning [4, 5] , and the expressiveness of propositional TLA [17] . Moreover, Lamport has developed a formal specification language TLA+ based on TLA.
Although TLA has been found to be expressively complete for stuttering-invariant -regular languages [17] , this does not necessarily imply that specifications can be expressed in a natural way. In fact, the syntactic restrictions imposed by Lamport that ensure invariance under stuttering occasionally make it hard to express seemingly simple properties. For example, whereas the requirement "eventually È will be true, and É will hold at some later state" is expressed by the formula ¦´È ¦Éµ, as in standard LTL, the analogous requirement "eventually action will be performed, some time later followed by action " is not expressed as easily. Eventual occurrence of action is expressed by the formula ¦ Ú , where describes the action as a relation on pairs of states, and Ú is (roughly speaking) the tuple of all state components of interest.
One might therefore expect to express the informal requirement above by a formula such as ¦ ª ¦ Ú « Ú , but TLA does not allow temporal formulas to occur inside an action formula (i.e., inside angle brackets). In some cases one can identify a state formula Ô that is true iff action has happened sometime in the past: for example, might represent a request for a resource, and Ô could be defined from the system's logfile. In those cases, we can express our requirement by the formula ¦ Ô Ú . This formula requires that eventually action occurs with Ô being true-hence must have occurred before. Observe, however, that the "point of reference" has changed with respect to the informal statement of the requirement, and that action is no longer mentioned directly. If no suitable formula Ô exists, we can "create" one using TLA's quantification over state variables, and write
This formula defines Ô to become true at the first occurrence of action and then remain true forever; it is an example for a so-called history variable [2] . Although the formula can be shown to capture the informal requirement, it is certainly not natural.
Another concern that has not been resolved in a satisfactory way is the question of proof systems, even for propositional TLA. Lamport [12] states a relative completeness result for first-order TLA, subject to expressiveness assumptions similar to those for Hoare logics, for specifications in so-called "normal form". Formulas that deviate from "normal form" specifications arise naturally when specifications are composed [4] . Abadi [1] has proposed an axiomatization of an earlier version of TLA, but it is not clear whether his proof system can be adapted to the present-day TLA. This is in contrast to standard propositional temporal logic (PTL) whose axiomatization has been well understood since a landmark paper by Gabbay et al [8] . Complete axiomatizations are perhaps of rather academic interest; nevertheless they supply important information about the principles that underly a given logic, and they can form the basis of practical verification systems. For example, an accepted axiomatization would have helped us with the mechanization of TLA in the generic interactive theorem prover Isabelle [14] .
In this paper we argue that the two shortcomings of TLA identified above are in fact related: we define the logic GTLA, which is a variant of TLA, but has a more liberal syntax. For example, ¦ ª ¦ Ú « Ú is a GTLA formula. We prove that GTLA, like TLA, is invariant under stuttering and provide a sound and complete axiomatization, via two different presentations. Finally, we show that TLA and GTLA are equally expressive once we add quantification over flexible propositions, preserving stuttering invariance. More precisely, while TLA is a sublogic of GTLA, every GTLA formula (possibly containing quantifiers) can be effectively translated to a quantified TLA formula. We argue that GTLA is better suited for verification than TLA. The added flexibility in expressiveness, which comes at no extra cost, may prove useful for writing specifications.
The plan of the paper is as follows: section 2 defines GTLA and contains the proof of stuttering invariance. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the first, heterogeneous version of an axiomatization for GTLA; an alternative, homogeneous presentation is derived in section 5. Section 6 compares the expressiveness of TLA and GTLA. Section 7 concludes the paper. Throughout, we restrict ourselves to propositional (or quantified propositional) logics, although the logic is easily extended to a first-order language.
In the following we assume standard abbreviations such as true, , , , and (equivalence, non-equivalence) for both formulas and pre-formulas. For compatibility with standard TLA syntax, we sometimes write Ú ¼ instead of Ú when Ú is an atomic proposition. For a finite set Î Ú ½ Ú Ò Î of atomic propositions we let £ È℄ Î denote the formula £ È℄ Ú½ £ È℄ ÚÒ ; in particular, £ È℄ equals true. Stretching the notation even further, we write £ È℄ (where is any formula) for 2 £ È ´ µ℄ Ø´ µ where Ø´ µ Î denotes the set of atomic propositions that occur in . We write ¦ for the formula £ and ¦ È Ú for £ È℄ Ú Formula follows from a set of formulas (written ) iff is valid over all behaviors over which all formulas ¾ are valid. Finally, is valid (written ) iff it is valid over all behaviors, which is equivalent to saying that it follows from .
Note that we have chosen the definition of floating validity, which is the traditional definition for modal logics, rather than the alternative anchored validity, which Lamport [12] uses. It is well known that either choice leads to the same set of valid formulas, although the consequence relation is different. We prefer floating validity because it is usually easier to axiomatize.
We say that a (pre-)formula is tautological if it results from a propositional tautology of classical logic by consistently replacing atomic subformulas of by formulas or pre-formulas. It is easy to see that every tautological formula is valid.
Stuttering invariance
Definition 1 allows the £ operator to be applied only to formulas. For example, £ Ú is not a pre-formula, although £Ú is. Had we allowed pre-formulas to freely contain outermost boxes, we would not obtain invariance under stuttering: consider, for example, £ £´Ô µ Õµ℄ Ô , which is not a GTLA formula, and the behaviors and , where differs from only in the repetition of a single state, as illustrated by the following diagram (where means "don't care"):
Assuming the last state to repeat indefinitely, £ £´Ô µ Õµ℄ Ô clearly holds of , but not of . We now formally define stuttering equivalence and prove that GTLA formulas do not distinguish between stuttering equivalent behaviors. Turning to assertion 2, we consider the cases in the definition of pre-formulas:
Definition 3 (stuttering equivalence
È a formula immediate from the induction hypothesis for assertion 1.
The assumption that ½ ³ Ø´ µ ½ and the induction hypothesis for assertion 1 imply ½ iff ½ , and therefore iff .
È È µ É analogous to the corresponding cases for formulas. ¶
An Axiomatization of GTLA
We now present a proof system ¦ ÌÄ for GTLA and prove its adequacy. ¦ ÌÄ is based on two provability relations and for formulas and pre-formulas; we therefore (ax0) whenever is tautological (pax0) call ¦ ÌÄ a heterogeneous proof system. An alternative "homogeneous" proof system will be given in section 5. Figure 1 contains the axioms and rules that define and . We extend to a relation between sets of formulas and formulas by defining iff can be established from the axioms and rules of ¦ ÌÄ if additionally is assumed for all formulas ¾ , and similarly define È. Because we are ultimately only interested in the relation for formulas, we do not allow pre-formulas to occur in the set of hypotheses.
Many of the axioms and rules of ¦ ÌÄ are familiar from propositional linear-time temporal logic [8, 9] . First observe that both and contain full propositional calculus. Axiom (ax3) is a "stuttering-invariant" version of the induction axiom. Its formulation relies essentially on the GTLA syntax that allows temporal formulas in the scope of the £ ℄ Ú operator. Axiom (ax5) effectively asserts that the pre-formula È in £ È℄ Ú is evaluated only when Ú changes value. Axiom (pax1) expresses that time is linear. We cannot state an induction principle for formulas of the form £ È℄ Ú because È or È℄ Ú are not even pre-formulas. For this reason, (pax4) is stronger than its counterparts (ax1) and (pax3). Axiom (pax5) asserts a form of commutativity for the and £ operators.
The rules (sq) and (nex) reflect the floating definition of validity. The necessitation rule (alw) £ can be derived in ¦ ÌÄ , as shown in the appendix. Note also that the axioms (ax2), (ax4), (pax4), (pax5) and the rule (sq) are easily generalized to versions where the "index" Ú is replaced by a finite set Î of atomic propositions, or by a GTLA formula. 
Theorem 6 (Soundness
results from an application of (pre), then by induction hypothesis we have £ µ , and therefore also £ µ , by (pre).
-If
À results from an application of (nex), then the induction hypothesis yields £ µ À. Rule (nex) shows ´£ µ Àµ, and we obtain £ µ À by (pax2) and (pmp). The conclusion £ µ À follows with the help of (pax3). ¶ The following are some derived theorems of ¦ ÌÄ , which will be used later.
Derivations of these theorems are given in section A of the appendix.
By rule (pre), every provable formula is also provable as a pre-formula. An important result for ¦ ÌÄ shows that the converse is also true. This can be shown by a careful analysis of the derivations in ¦ ÌÄ , given in section B of the appendix. We can therefore only hope for completeness when is a finite set, and by theorem 7 it is enough to show that implies . Our completeness proof follows the standard approach [9] of constructing a model for a finite and consistent set of formulas. To do so, we have to assemble information about pre-formulas as well as formulas. Nevertheless, the critical step in the proof is to show that all the essential information is contained in the formulas used for the construction; this is due to the fact that the assumptions in a derivation do not contain pre-formulas. For a set of formulas and pre-formulas, we denote by the set of all formulas contained in . We also use to denote the conjunction of all (pre-) formulas in ; it will always be clear from the context whether we refer to the set or the (pre-)formula.
A set is called inconsistent if , otherwise it is called consistent. Note that if is consistent and is any formula or pre-formula, one of the sets or is again consistent.
We inductively define a set ´ µ for any formula or pre-formula , as follows:
For a set , we define ´ µ as the union of all ´ µ, for all (pre-)formulas contained in . Note that our definitions ensure that ´ µ is finite whenever is finite. We say that is complete if it contains either or , for every (pre-)formula from ´ µ. Observe that for every finite and consistent there exist only finitely many finite, consistent, and complete £ , since ´ µ is itself finite; we call any such £ a completion of . We note the following elementary facts about complete sets. The proofs of assertions 1 and 3 are standard, whereas the second assertion follows from the first and theorem 8 by propositional reasoning, since µ holds for any set by (ax0). 
We now define a set ´ µ of formulas that, intuitively, transfer information from one state of the model under construction to the next one.
Lemma 11. Assume that is finite.
If is consistent, then so is ´ µ.
Proof. 1. By (T8), it is enough to show µ , for every formula ¾ ´ µ. We distinguish the different cases in the definition of ´ µ.
-For ¾ ½´ µ, we have ¾ , so the assertion follows by (pax0). -If ¾ ¾´ µ, then ¾ , and the assertion follows using (pax1). Using axiom (pax1) and propositional logic, assertion (1) implies , that is, is inconsistent. ¶ Given a finite and consistent set of formulas, we inductively define a graph Ì´ µ of sets of pre-formulas as follows:
-All different completions of are nodes of Ì´ µ, called the roots of Ì´ µ.
-If is a node in Ì´ µ then its successors are all different completions of ´ µ.
It follows that every node is finite, consistent, and complete. Also, the sub-graph of Ì´ µ that consists of all nodes reachable from the successors of is just Ì´ ´ µµ.
Lemma 12.
Assume that is a finite and consistent set of formulas.
Ì´ µ contains only finitely many different nodes
(ii)
Proof. 1. The completions of a finite set only contain -possibly negated -preformulas from the set ´ µ, which is also finite. On the other hand, the only preformulas in ´ µ that are possibly not in ´ µ are of the form or such that contains or , hence the number of operators decreases, which is possible only finitely often. Therefore, only finitely many different (pre-)formulas occur in Ì´ µ, hence Ì´ µ can contain only finitely many different nodes. . Then (ax0) gives Á µ , which proves Á £ , using rule (alw). By theorem 7, we conclude £Á µ £ .
Lemma 12.2(iii) yields
´ µ µ £ , but on the other hand we have ´ µ µ £ because £ ¾ ´ µ. Therefore, ´ µ and (by lemma 11.2) also is inconsistent, and a contradiction is reached.
Similarly, we show that there is some node À in Ì´ ´ µµ that contains È and either Ú Ú or Ú Ú whenever £ È℄ Ú ¾ and either È ¾ or Ú Ú or Ú Ú . Suppose not. Then an argument analogous to the one above establishes that every node À contains È or Ú Ú or Ú Ú . By axiom (pax0), this shows À µ È℄ Ú . Lemma 12.2(i) implies Á µ È℄ Ú , and by (ax1) and (pre), a fortiori £Á µ È℄ Ú . Using rule (sq) and (ax4), this shows £ £Á℄ Ú µ £ È℄ Ú ℄ Ú , and (T3) implies that £ £Á℄ Ú µ £ È℄ Ú . But as above we have ´ µ µ £Á, and thus also ´ µ µ £ £Á℄ Ú by (ax2), which proves ´ µ µ £ È℄ Ú . On the other hand, we know ´ µ µ £ È℄ Ú by assumption and reach a contradiction. These two claims ensure that for every node in Ì´ µ that contains either £ or £ È℄ Ú there exists some node ¼ reachable from that satisfies the condition from the definition of a complete path. For if itself does not satisfy the condition, the formula is contained in ´ µ, hence Ì´ ´ µµ, which is just the subgraph of Ì´ µ whose roots are the sons of , contains a node as required.
The assertion is now proved by fixing some order on the finite set of formulas £ and £ È℄ Ú that occur in Ì´ µ and an iterative construction that constructs a complete path piecewise by repeatedly considering the eventuality formulas in the chosen order. The details of this construction are standard [8, 9] . ¶ Lemma 14. Assume that is a finite and consistent set of formulas and that ¼ ½ is a complete path in Ì´ µ. For every ¼, the following assertions hold: 
A Homogeneous Axiomatization
The system ¦ ÌÄ is based on the auxiliary relation besides the relation that we are really interested in. One may argue that one could instead simply translate propositional (G)TLA to PTL and use any standard PTL proof system. Still, proofs may then contain PTL formulas such as £ that are not even pre-formulas of GTLA. We now (hx0) whenever is tautological
show that it is possible to eliminate the auxiliary relation and define a "homogeneous" axiomatization of GTLA based on a single provability relation . The key observation is that in ¦ ÌÄ , a derived pre-formula can only be used via rule (sq) in the derivation of a formula. It therefore suffices to "box" the axioms (pax0)-(pax5) and rephrase (pre), (nex), and (pmp) accordingly. The proof system ¦ ÌÄ shown in figure 2 is based on this idea and some further simplifications. The following theorems and rules can be derived in ¦ ÌÄ ; the proofs are again given in section A of the appendix.
it is easy to derive analogues of these rules where the "index" Ú is replaced by a finite set of atomic propositions, or by a GTLA formula.
We now prove that the two provability relations agree (where is defined in the obvious way). In particular, ¦ ÌÄ is also sound and complete. It is therefore a matter of taste and convenience which axiomatization to use. The homogeneous proof system is aesthetically more satisfactory, but the heterogeneous system may be easier to use. (This is why the completeness proof was given for ¦ ÌÄ .)
Theorem 17. For any set of formulas and any formula , iff .
Proof. "only if": By induction on the length of the assumed derivation in ¦ ÌÄ , we prove that whenever and that £ È℄ Ú , for all atomic propositions Ú, whenever È, for any pre-formula È.
If is from or if it is an instance of (ax0), (ax1), (ax3), (ax4) or (ax5) then the assertion holds trivially because these axioms are also contained in ¦ ÌÄ . Axiom (ax2) is derived in ¦ ÌÄ as follows:
If the last step in the derivation of is an application of (mp) to previously derived formulas and µ then by induction hypothesis we have and µ , so follows by rule (hmp). If the last step in the derivation of is an application of (sq) to some previously derived pre-formula È (so is £ È℄ Ú ) then by the induction hypothesis for the second assertion we already have
The second assertion is trivial if the last step in the derivation of È is an instance of (pax0), (pax1), (pax2) or (pax5) because ¦ ÌÄ contains corresponding axioms. The case of (pax3) is taken care of by (H5). As for (pax4), it could obviously be replaced by
without changing the set of pre-formulas derivable in ¦ ÌÄ . The axioms (hx10) and (hx12) directly correspond to (pax4a) and (pax4c), so it remains to consider the case of (pax4b):
Considering the rules, the case of (pmp) is handled by the induction hypothesis and (H1). If the last step in the derivation of È is an application of (pre), then È is actually a formula and has already been derived, so we may assume È by induction hypothesis. We obtain £ È℄ Ú by (H2). If the last step is an application of (nex), then È is , for some previously derived formula , and by induction hypothesis we may assume . We continue as follows:
The proof is again by induction on the assumed derivation of . The cases of (hx0), (hx1), (hx4), (hx5), and (hx6) are trivial because ¦ ÌÄ contains the same axioms. For (hx7), (hx8), (hx9), (hx10), (hx12), and (hx13), the proof uses the corresponding axioms of ¦ ÌÄ and rule (sq). For (hmp) and (alw), the assertion follows from the induction hypothesis and rules (mp) and (alw), which is a derived rule in ¦ ÌÄ . The axiom (hx2) is derived in ¦ ÌÄ as follows:
The derivation of (hx3) is similar, using (pax3) instead of (ax1). The derivation of (hx11) is very similar to that of (T4) and is omitted. ¶
Quantification and Expressiveness
We have remarked in section 2 that propositional TLA is a sublanguage of GTLA whose pre-formulas are restricted to boolean combinations of primed and unprimed proposition symbols. On the other hand, GTLA can be considered as a sublanguage of PTL by removing the distinction between formulas and pre-formulas and considering £ È℄ Ú as a short-hand notation for the PTL formula £´È ´ Ú Úµµ. Lamport's intention in introducing TLA was to allow the implementation relation between two descriptions of systems, even at different levels of abstraction, to be represented by model inclusion on the semantic side, and by validity of implication inside the logic [13] . Theorem 5 gives a formal expression to this intention, so GTLA satisfies Lamport's requirement. Does GTLA add any undesired expressiveness to TLA? We will now show that this is not the case by proving that TLA and GTLA become equi-expressive once we add quantification over atomic propositions.
We introduce two auxiliary relations on behaviors that are used in a stutteringinvariant semantics of quantification over atomic propositions. We now extend GTLA by quantification over atomic propositions. Conceptually, existential quantification corresponds to the hiding of state components in specifications. Following Lamport, we use a bold quantifier symbol to emphasize that its semantics is non-standard, which helps to preserve stuttering invariance.
Definition 20 ( -GTLA). The semantics of quantified formulas is defined for -GTLA in the same way as for TLA. It is therefore immediate that quantified propositional TLA is again a sublogic of -GTLA. We now show that the two logics are equally expressive by effectively constructing an equivalent (quantified) TLA formula for every -GTLA formula. 
Formulas and pre-formulas of -

Conclusion
The logic GTLA defined in this paper is a variant of Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions. Like TLA, its formulas do not distinguish between behaviors that are stuttering equivalent. However, GTLA removes some apparently unnecessary restrictions on the syntax of formulas. We have also shown that the propositional fragment of GTLA admits a complete and reasonably simple axiomatization. In fact, our proof systems ¦ ÌÄ and ¦ ÌÄ are much simpler than Abadi's axiomatization [1] of a previous version of TLA. We have been careful to adhere to TLA as closely as possible. In particular, every TLA formula is a GTLA formula, and the two logics are equally expressive once we add (stuttering-invariant) quantification over flexible proposition symbols, as proposed by Lamport. By Rabinovich's result of expressive completeness for TLA [17] , it follows that -GTLA is expressively complete for all stuttering-invariant -languages definable in the monadic second-order theory of linear orders. We believe that GTLA is a more natural explanation of TLA's concepts. The difference between TLA and GTLA lies in the fact that in GTLA, formulas and pre-formulas are defined by mutual induction, whereas the syntax of TLA is defined in succeeding layers. In particular, GTLA allows temporal formulas to occur inside the £ ℄ Ú operator. The fact that such formulas can already expressed in TLA via quantification over flexible variables (cf. the proof of theorem 22) is easily overlooked in the original definition of TLA. It will remain to be seen whether the added flexibility of GTLA is useful for writing system specifications.
There are alternative definitions of stuttering-invariant temporal logics. The easiest way to obtain invariance under stuttering is to interpret the operator of PTL not as referring to the immediate successor state, but to the first state in the future that differs in the valuation of some proposition (and to let be true if no such state exists). The resulting logic is axiomatized by a minor variant of the standard PTL proof system, and it is "globally" stuttering-invariant with respect to ³, but not "locally" with respect to ³ Ø´ µ , as determined by the formula under consideration. Unfortunately, "global" stuttering invariance is not enough to represent implementation by model inclusion. Another example for a globally stuttering-invariant logic is Pnueli's TLR [16] . The logic MTL defined by Mokkedem and Méry [15] is "locally" stuttering-invariant, but the authors did not prove a completeness result. On the other hand, one could obtain an axiomatization of TLA or GTLA by interpreting their formulas in PTL. However, this approach breaks when it comes to quantified formulas, due the stuttering-invariant definition of the semantics for (see also [17] ).
GTLA is easily extended to a first-order logic where atomic propositions are replaced by atomic predicate-logic formulas, except for the "subscripts" Ú in formulas £ È℄ Ú , which should then be state variables. (The generalization to arbitrary terms can be introduced as a short-hand notation as we have done in this paper.) Of course, one cannot hope for full completeness of first-order GTLA. Nevertheless, the ability to reason about the propositional fragment, together with some simple rules about (rigid) quantification has turned out to be extremely useful in the application of standard lineartime temporal logic, and we believe the same to be true for TLA.
A Derived theorems and rules
We give derivations for theorems and rules used in the main text, using a conventional presentation of Hilbert style derivations. These derivations give some indication on the practical use of ¦ ÌÄ . Steps based on propositional reasoning are indicated by (prop).
(alw)
£ (mp)(1) (5) Applying (alw) twice, and using the deduction theorem 7, shows £ µ ££ , and by (ax1) therefore also theorem
£ È℄ Ú µ ££ È℄ Ú (2)(ax3)(mp)
£ È℄ Ú ℄ Ú µ £ È℄ Ú (prop)(5)(6)
££ È℄ Ú µ £ È℄ Ú (ax1)(pre)
£ µ
£ µ´ µ µ℄ (sq)(6)
£ µ´ µ £ µ (pre)(9)(5)(prop)
£ £ (prop)(4)(10)
B Proof of theorem 8
We now prove that the relations and agree on formulas. One direction is immediate by rule (pre), the other direction requires a close examination of possible derivations that result in a statement È. To make the notation more concise, we use a sequence notation for implications that are nested to the right. For example, we write µ for µ´ µ µ.
First, we need to be more precise about (pax0). It is well known that the following axiom schemes, together with modus ponens, completely axiomatize propositional calculus:
In fact, (pax0.1)-(pax0.3) are already sufficient for propositional completeness. We have added the redundant axioms (pax0.4)-(pax0.6) in order to prove that, essentially, there is no need for doubly negated (pre-)formulas in derivations, as shown in lemma 23 below. Moreover, we replace (pax1) and (pax4) by the following axioms, which do not contain derived propositional operators, where (pax1.3) and (pax1.4) are again easily derived in the original system ¦ ÌÄ . Proof. Straightforward induction on the length of derivations. In particular, £ is an instance of (ax0) iff is. The addition of (pax0.4)-(pax0.6), (pax1.3), and (pax1.4) ensure that the assertion holds for every possible instance of (pax0.1)-(pax5). ¶
The assertions 1 and 4 of the following lemma are used in the proof of theorem 8. However, we need the other assertions in order to make the induction go through. Proof. We prove all assertions simultaneously, using induction on the overall complexity of the assumed derivations, which we measure as a pair whose first component is the number of steps and whose second component is the combined length of the derived formulas (i.e., the number of symbols). is from and is from È then again we have by the induction hypothesis for assertion 1. Moreover, we have the assumption ´ µ µ µ , and we may again apply the induction hypothesis for assertion 1 to conclude ´ µ µ µ , from which follows by propositional logic. Together, and imply
is from È and is from , we have µ and . By lemma 23 there is a derivation whose length does not exceed that of the derivation of . Using rule (pmp), we therefore obtain a derivation of at most the same length as the assumed one of the simpler formula , which by the induction hypothesis for assertion 1 implies , as desired. (d we obtain £´ µ µ and £ . Using (ax1), we get µ and , so (mp) gives , and the assertion, £ follows by rule (alw).
(pax3) : Then £ and is £ , for some formula . If £ is in , then the assertion is £ µ ££ , which follows from (T1). If £ is in È, we have £ , and therefore £ , by the induction hypothesis for assertion 1. The assertion, ££ , follows by rule (alw). 
